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Abstract
Recent theoretical models predict gains from international trade coming from intra-industry
reallocations, due to a firm selection effect. In this paper we answer two related questions. First,
what is the magnitude of this selection effect, and how does it compare to that of intra-national
trade? Second, would the removal of ’behind-the-border’ trade frictions between integrated EU
countries lead to large productivity gains? To answer these questions, we extend and calibrate
the Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) model on productivity and trade data for European economies
in 2000, and simulate counterfactual trade liberalization scenarios. We consider 11 EU countries
and a total of 31 economies, including 21 French regions. Our first result is that, in the French
case, international trade has a sizeable impact on aggregate productivity, but smaller than that of
intra-national trade. Second, substantial productivity gains (around 20%) can be expected from
’behind-the-border’ integration. In both experiments, we predict the corresponding variations in
average prices, markups, quantities and profits. We show that the model fits sales and exports
data reasonably well, and we perform a number of robustness checks. We also suggest some
explanations for the substantial cross-economy and cross-industry variations in our estimates of
productivity gains, highlighting the importance of accessibility and competitiveness.
Keywords: European integration, intra-national trade, firm-level data, firm selection, gains
from trade, total factor productivity
J.E.L. Classification: F12, R13.
∗Gregory Corcos, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH),
Norway. Email: gregory.corcos@nhh.no. Massimo Del Gatto, Department of Economics, University of Cagliari, Italy.
Email: mdelgatto@unica.it. Corresponding author: Giordano Mion, CORE, Universite´ Catholique de Louvain,
Belgium. Email: giordano.mion@uclouvain.be. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Department of Economics, University
of Bologna, Italy. Email: gianmarco.ottaviano@unibo.it. We are indebted to ZEW Mannheim for access to their
MIP dataset. We thank Pol Antra`s, Keith Head, Elhanan Helpman, Hubert Jayet, Thierry Mayer, and Michael
Pfaffermayr for helpful comments. The second and fourth authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from
MIUR. Part of this research was done while the first author was visiting Harvard University, whose hospitality is
gratefully acknowledged. Errors are ours.
1
1 Introduction
In recent decades, as tariff barriers have been generally and steadily falling worldwide, non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) have become a crucial concern for international organizations due to their poten-
tially harmful effects on trade and development. NTBs consist of all barriers to trade that are not
tariffs and include all interferences with international trade that distort the free flow of goods and
services. As such they include, for example, import quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs)
but also export subsidies. To NTBs belong ‘behind-the-border’ trade barriers (BTBs) stemming
from domestic regulations that cover government procurement, product standards, inward foreign
investment, competition law, labor standards, and environmental norms. These barriers are the
main concern within free trade areas such as NAFTA and the EU. Indeed, mixed feelings about the
success of the Single Market Program (SMP) are largely motivated by the persistence of BTBs that
seem to disproportionately hamper the internationalization of firms, especially small and medium-
sized enterprises.
The aim of the present paper is to quantify the additional gains from trade that would accrue
to EU countries from the dismantlement of their BTBs beyond what the SMP has already achieved
in terms of other NTBs. Our focus is on the effects of NTBs on productivity and markups as
these played centre stage in the recommendations and forecasts of the European Commission when
the SMP was launched in 1993. Prime examples are the White Paper on Completing the Internal
Market (European Commission, 1985), and the Cecchini Report (Cecchini et al., 1988).1 While
the analysis is carried out for the EU, its implications are of broader interest as BTBs strain
trade relations of both developed and developing countries (see, e.g., European Commission, 2006;
Hoekman, Mattoo and English, 2002).
The specific channel we investigate is the one highlighted by the recent literature on firm
heterogeneity (Bernard et al., 2003;Melitz, 2003), according to which trade liberalization has a
positive impact on aggregate productivity through the survival of the most productive firms and
the death of the least productive ones. The reason is a combination of import competition, which is
harmful to all firms, and export market access, which benefits only firms that are productive enough
to afford the additional costs of internationalization. This selection mechanism finds empirical
support in firm-level analyses (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw,
Chung and Roberts, 2000; Tybout, 2003) and is consistent with the aggregate evidence provided
in Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004).
To evaluate the gains from removing BTBs, we calibrate the theoretical model of trade with
heterogenous firms by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). This model has two important advantages over
those of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2006). First, it predicts that larger markets are associated with
lower markups and prices, bigger firms, and less productivity dispersion. These findings are more
consistent with cross-regional evidence in the US retail, concrete and cement industry (Campbell
and Hopenhayn, 2002, Syverson 2004 a,b) than those of the former models.2 Second, the Melitz-
Ottaviano model is easier to calibrate, as it does not require data on the fixed costs of exporting,
which are notoriously difficult to obtain.
Our calibrated simulation builds on Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006), who investigate
1This initial emphasis has hardly been matched by ex post evaluation. Exceptions are Notaro (2002) and Bernard
and Leroy (2003). The Commission’s 1996 Single Market Review did not address productivity gains.
2The difference between the present and the aforementioned papers comes from an important difference in mod-
elling choices. The Melitz-Ottaviano model uses a linear demand system with a non-constant elasticity of substitution.
Optimal markups are not constant, and more productive firms set higher markups. An increase in market size inten-
sifies competition and increases the elasticities of substitution, which in turn changes the distribution of performance
variables.
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how trade integration affects productivity levels through firm selection, using individual panel
data across 11 EU countries. We enrich their dataset by breaking up one country (France) into a
collection of 21 regional (NUTS2) economies trading with EU partners and with one another.3 This
extension has three advantages. First, focusing on France allows us to study the effect of intra-
national vs. international trade in a large European country. To the best of our knowledge, this
delivers the first analysis of firm selection on comparable individual panel data across sub-national
economies. Second, French data allow us to assess the relevance of BTBs by estimating the effects
that regional borders have on intra-national trade flows and comparing them with international
border effects. Last, firm level data on French firms can be used to quantify the impact of BTBs
on their performance variables.
In particular, we use the structurally estimated model to explore three scenarios. The first
scenario is used to validate our calibrations with respect to Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006).
In particular, we assess the productivity losses that would be associated with international autarky
(‘costs of non-Europe’).4 In the enriched dataset we find that with prohibitive international bar-
riers, average country productivity in 2000 would have dropped by roughly 11.6 percent in our
11 countries, compared to the 12.7 percent found by Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006). The
second scenario is designed to assess the relative magnitude of the gains from international vs intra-
national trade in terms of average productivity. To do so, we perform an exercise analogous to the
former one, by simulating average productivity levels for France when allowing for inter- but not
intra-national trade (‘costs of non-France’). We find that non-France causes a 25% productivity loss
for an average French region, which is much larger than its 8% loss from non-Europe. This reveals
the overwhelming importance of the domestic market for the firms of a relatively large country
such as France.
The third and last scenario is used to assess the hypothetical productivity increase that would
stem from the removal of BTBs among EU countries. To do that, we set the ‘thickness’ of borders
between EU countries at the same level as those between French regions (‘United Europe’). This
removes all international trade frictions that come from the crossing of a border, irrespective of
the distance between trading partners. When the thickness of borders is measured by the ‘border
effects’ of theoretically-grounded gravity equations, ‘United Europe’ corresponds to a 34% decrease
in average trade costs and leads to a 20% increase in average productivity. This productivity gain
can be mapped into a 13.14% decrease in prices and markups and a 22.57% and a 12.96% decrease
in average profits and quantities, respectively. The productivity gain for the average French region
is roughly 9%. These numbers reveal the existence of substantial gains from removing of BTBs
within the EU.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 3 derives its equilibrium properties and designs the simulation strategy. Section 4 describes
the dataset. In Section 5 we estimate some parameters of the model. Section 6 describes the
calibration procedure, shows the goodness of fit of the model and simulates our three alternative
integration scenarios. In Section 7 we explore the robustness of our results to a variety of alternative
productivity and trade freeness estimations. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
3France is composed of 22 administrative regions. However, due to data availability, we must exclude one region
(Corsica) from the analysis. Hence, we study 21 regional and 10 national economies.
4This expression ‘cost of non-Europe’ was coined in the Cecchini report, to refer to the economic cost of not
completing the common market.
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2 The model
Consider a system of economies, indexed l = 1, ...,M , endowed with labor and capital that are
immobile between countries. In each economy l, Ll identical workers supply labor, one unit each
inelastically. Workers own capital and each of them holds a balanced portfolio, so they are only
interested in expected returns.
2.1 Demand
The focus is on a subgroup of M sectors that are active in all economies and take factor returns as
given. The product of each of these sectors s = 1, ..., S is horizontally differentiated in a continuum
of varieties indexed by i ∈ Ωs. Not all existing varieties are necessarily demanded and eΩls ⊂ Ωls
denotes the subset of varieties actually consumed by the residents of economy l. Individual inverse
demand for i ∈ eΩls is given by
pls(i) = αs − γsdls(i)− ηsDls, (1)
where pls(i) and dls(i) are price and quantity demanded of variety i, while Dls =
R
i∈Ωs d
l
s(i)di is
total consumption of all varieties in sector s. The parameters αs > 0 and ηs > 0 measure the
degree of product differentiation between good s and the other goods in the economy: a larger αs
and a smaller ηs shift out the inverse demand schedule. The parameter γs > 0 measures, instead,
the degree of product differentiation between the varieties of good s: a larger γs makes the inverse
demand steeper.
The market demand for each variety i ∈ eΩls can be obtained by inverting (1):
qls(i) ≡ Lldls(i) =
αsLl
ηsN ls + γs
− L
l
γs
pls(i) +
ηsN ls
ηsN ls + γs
Ll
γs
p¯ls, ∀i ∈ eΩls, (2)
where Ll is the total number of resident consumers in economy l, N ls is the measure of consumed
varieties in eΩls and p¯ls = ¡1/N ls¢ Ri∈hΩls pls(i)di is their average price. Since eΩls is the subset of varieties
that are actually consumed, it is the largest subset of Ωls that satisfies
pls(i) ≤
1
ηsN ls + γs
³
γsαs + ηsN
l
sp¯
l
s
´
≡ pls. (3)
so that p¯ls ≤ αs with strict inequality in the presence of price heterogeneity. For a given level of
product differentiation γs, a lower average price p¯ls or a larger number of competing varieties N ls
raises the price elasticity of demand and decreases the price bound pls due to a tougher competitive
environment.
2.2 Supply
The N ls varieties of good s consumed by the residents of economy l may be supplied both by
domestic firms and by exporters located in other economies. In all sectors market structure is
monopolistic competition and each variety is supplied by one and only one firm. All firms face a
Cobb-Douglas production technology that transforms labor, capital (and intermediate inputs) into
final output under constant returns to scale. Within sectors the Cobb-Douglas factor shares are
the same for all firms in all economies. Factor prices and total factor productivities vary instead
between economies. The latter also vary between firms within sectors and economies.
Within sectors and economies, firm heterogeneity is introduced by modeling entry as a research
and development process with uncertain outcome. In particular, each entrant has to invent its
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own variety and a corresponding production process by making an irreversible investment f ls in
terms of labor, capital and intermediate inputs. A prospective entrant knows for certain that it
will invent a new variety and that it will produce using a Cobb-Douglas technology with given
factor shares. It does not know, however, its total factor productivity and thus nor its marginal
cost of production c as these are randomly determined only after f ls has been sunk. Uncertainty is
modeled as a draw from a common and known distribution Gls(c), with support [0, clA,s], which varies
across sectors and economies. The upper bound of the support clA,s is exogenously assigned, which
allows us to introduce (probabilistic) ‘comparative advantage’ stemming from factor endowment and
technological differences between economies that affect the distribution of firm-level cost draws. For
example, if
³
clA,s/c
l
A,r
´
<
³
chA,s/c
h
A,r
´
, economies l and h are said to have comparative advantages
in sectors s and r respectively. Relative to entrants in h (l), entrants in l (h) have a ‘better chance’
of getting lower cost draws in sector s than in sector r.
National markets are segmented. Nevertheless, firms can produce in one market and sell in
another by incurring a per-unit trade cost. The overall cost of a delivered unit with cost c from
economy h to economy l is τhls c with τhls > 1, where (τhls − 1)c is the frictional trade cost. We
interpret such a cost in a wide sense as resulting from all impediments to trade. For this reason,
even within an economy, trade may not be costless and we allow for τ lls ≥ 1.
Since the entry cost f ls is sunk, only entrants that can cover their marginal cost survive and
produce. All other entrants exit without even starting production. Survivors maximize their profits
facing the demand function (2). Given the continuum of competitors, a firm takes the average
price level p¯ls and number of firm N ls as given. Let plhs (c) and qlhs (c) denote the levels of the profit-
maximizing price and quantity delivered for a firm in sector s producing in economy l with cost c
and selling to economy h. Since we assume that markets are segmented by economy and production
faces constant returns to scale, firms independently maximize the profits earned from sales to each
economy. Let πlhs (c) denote the maximized value of these profits. Then, the profit maximizing prices
and output levels must satisfy: πlhs (c) =
£
plhs (c)− τ lhs c
¤
qlhs (c) and qlhs (c) =
¡
Lh/γs
¢ £
plhs (c)− τ lhs c
¤
.
Only firms earning non-negative profits in a market will choose to serve that market. This implies
a number of similar cost cutoff rules for firms selling to the various markets. Let clhs denote the
upper bound cost inclusive of trade costs (‘delivered cost’) for firms producing in economy l and
selling to economy h. Recalling (3), this (endogenous) cost cutoff must then satisfy:
clhs = sup
n
τ lhs c : π
lh
s (c) > 0
o
= phs (4)
which implies that clhs = ckhs = chs for all l, k = 1, ...,M . Note that, for given phs , higher trade
barriers from l to h make it harder for exporters from l to break even relative to their competitors
from k as the former need better cost draws than the latter in order to break even. The cost cutoffs
summarize all the effects of market conditions that are relevant for firm performance. In particular,
the optimal prices and output levels can be written as:
plhs (c) =
1
2
(chs + τ
lh
s c), q
lh
s (c) =
Lh
2γs
³
chs − τ lhs c
´
(5)
which yield the following maximized operating profit levels:
πlhs (c) =
Lh
4γs
³
chs − τ lhs c
´2
. (6)
with markup:
μlhs (c) =
1
2
³
chs − τhls c
´
(7)
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Firms choose a production location prior to entry and sink the corresponding entry cost f ls.
Free entry of firms in economy l then implies zero expected profits in equilibrium:
MX
h=1
"Z chs /τ lhs
0
πlhs (c)dG
l
s(c)
#
= f ls. (8)
The M cost cutoffs can be calculated by substituting (6) into (8) and solving the resulting system
ofM equations for l = 1, ...,M . The number of sellers to each country can be found by substituting
(4) into (3) and solving the M resulting equations individually:
Nhs =
2γs
ηs
αs − chs
chs − c¯hs
, (9)
where c¯hs =
PM
l=1
nhR clhs
0 τ
lh
s cdGls(c)
i
/Gls(clhs )
o
is the average delivered cost of sellers.
3 Equilibrium
All the results derived in the previous section hold for any distribution of cost drawsGls(c). However,
to implement the model empirically, we must use a specific parametrization for the distribution,
whose empirical relevance will then be tested. In particular, we assume that in sector s and economy
l productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter ks ≥ 1, which implies a
distribution of cost draws c given by
Gls(c) =
Ã
c
clA,s
!ks
, c ∈ [0, clA,s]. (10)
The shape parameter ks indexes the dispersion of cost draws in sector s; it is the same in all
economies. When ks = 1, the cost distribution is uniform on [0, clA,s]. As ks increases, the relative
number of high cost firms increases, and the cost distribution is more concentrated at higher cost
levels. As ks goes to infinity, the distribution becomes degenerate at clA,s. Any truncation of the cost
distribution from above at chs/τ lhs < clA,s retains the same distribution function and shape parameter
ks. The productivity distribution of firms producing in l and selling to h is therefore also Pareto with
shape ks, and the truncated cost distribution is given by Glhs (c) =
£
c/(clhs /τ lhs )
¤ks , c ∈ [0, clhs /τ lhs ].
3.1 Cutoffs
Let ρlhs ≡
¡
τ lhs
¢−ks ∈ (0, 1] measure the ‘freeness’ of trade for exports from l to h, which allows us
to define the following trade freeness matrix for sector s:
Ps ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ρ11s ρ12s · · · ρ1Ms
ρ21s ρ22s · · · ρ2Ms
...
...
. . .
...
ρM1s ρM2s · · · ρMMs
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Given our parametrization, the free entry condition (8) in economy l can be rewritten as:
MX
h=1
ρlhs L
h
³
chs
´ks+2
=
2γs(ks + 1)(ks + 2)f ls
ψls
l = 1, ...,M, (11)
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where ψls =
³
clA,s
´−ks
is an index of absolute advantage in sector s. This yields a system of M
equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cutoffs in sector s using Cramer’s
rule:
chs =
Ã
2(ks + 1)(ks + 2)γs
|Ps|
PM
l=1
¯¯
Clhs
¯¯
/(ψls/f ls)
Lh
! 1
ks+2
h = 1, ...,M, (12)
where |Ps| is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix and
¯¯
Clhs
¯¯
is the cofactor of its ρlhs element.
Cross-economy differences in cutoffs arise from four sources: own economy size (Lh), as well as a
combination of market accessibility, entry barriers and comparative advantage (
PM
l=1
¯¯
Clhs
¯¯
/(ψls/f ls).
Economies benefiting from a larger local market, a better distribution of productivity draws, lower
barriers to entry and better market accessibility have lower cutoffs.**5**
3.2 Performance Variables
Under the Pareto assumption, average performance variables for sellers in country h can be ex-
pressed as functions of the domestic cutoffs (12). In particular, average (delivered) costs, prices,
quantities, markups and operating profits evaluate to:
chs =
ks
ks+1c
h
s
p¯hs =
2ks+1
2(ks+1)
chs
qhs = (ks + 2)
SM
l=1|Clhs |/(ψls/f ls)
|Ps|
¡
chs
¢−(ks+1)
μhs =
1
2(ks+1)c
h
s
πhs =
SM
l=1|Clhs |/(ψls/f ls)
|Ps|
¡
chs
¢−ks
(13)
These results point out that smaller cutoffs generate smaller average costs, prices and markups.
In particular, a percentage change in the cutoff chs has the same percentage impact on both the
average markup μhs (‘pro-competitive effect’) and the average cost chs (‘selection effect’). Through
these channels, a percentage change in the cutoff translates into an identical percentage change
in the average price. Each channel is responsible for half of the impact since (13) implies p¯hs =
(2ks + 1)
p
μhs chs/2ks.
As for average profits and quantities the question is slightly more complicated. The endogenous
cutoffs chs are a function, among other things, of trade freeness. At the same time trade freeness
enters in the equations determining πhs and qhs directly via the cofactors Clhs and the determinant
|Ps|. Therefore, when simulating counterfactual trade costs changes (as we do later on) we have
to take into account both the direct and indirect (via chs ) effect of changes in trade freeness to
determine the new average profits and quantities. On the one hand, a better accessibility decreases
chs pushing towards an increase of both average profits and quantities in (13). Intuitively, this comes
from the fact that in a tougher competitive environment resources are reallocated towards large
and more productive firms that make more profits and sells. However, a better accessibility also
turns into a direct decrease of the term
SM
l=1|Clhs |
|Ps| in (13). Intuitively, this second effect is related to
the equilibrium adjustment in the number of local sellers. As we show later on in equation (14), the
number of sellers is in fact monotonically decreasing with chs . Therefore in a tougher competitive
environment the number of varieties sold locally increase pushing quantities and profits down.
Which one of the two effects dominates is a priori undeterminate.
5Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) show that in each country welfare is a decreasing function of the domestic cost
cutoff.
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3.3 Number of Firms
Turning to the number of firms, the mass of sellers Nhs is obtained from (9) after substituting the
value of chs in (13):
Nhs =
2γs(ks + 1)
ηs
αs − chs
chs
(14)
Sellers consist of domestic producers and foreign exporters. Accordingly, given a positive mass
of entrants N lE,s in all countries, N
h
s equals
PM
l=1G
l
s(chs/τ lhs )N lE,s. By (4) and (10), this equality
provides a system of M linear equations
MX
l=1
ρlhs ψ
l
sN
l
E,s =
Nhs
(chs )
ks
.
that can be solved for the number of entrants in the M countries using Cramer’s rule:
N lE,s =
2 (ks + 1) γs
ηs |Ps|ψls
MX
h=1
¡
αs − chs
¢ ¯¯
Clhs
¯¯
(chs )
ks+1
(15)
Given N lE,s entrants in country l, N
l
E,sG
l
s(cls/τ lls ) firms survive and produce for the local market.
Among them, N lE,sG
l
s(chs/τ lhs ) export to country h. Thus, the measure of producers located in
country l is:
N lP,s = ψ
l
sN
l
E,sρ
ll
s
³
cls
´ks
(16)
3.4 Trade Flows
The model yields a gravity equation for aggregate bilateral trade flows. In sector s an exporter
from l to h with cost c generates f.o.b. export sales rlhs (c) = plhs (c)qlhs (c). Aggregating over all
exporters from l to h (with cost c ≤ chs/τ lhs ) yields the aggregate bilateral exports in sector s from
l to h. Expressions (4) and (5) then imply aggregate bilateral exports equal to:
EXP lhs =
1
2γs (ks + 2)
N lE,sψ
l
sL
h
³
chs
´ks+2
ρlhs . (17)
which is a gravity equation in so far as it determines bilateral exports as a (log-linear) function of
bilateral trade barriers and economy characteristics. In particular, it reflects the combined effects
of market size, comparative advantage, and geography on both the extensive (number of traded
goods) and intensive (amount traded per good) margins of trade flows.6 It shows that a lower
cutoff chs dampens exports by making it harder for potential exporters to break into the market.
3.5 From Theory to Simulation
The model developed so far can be calibrated and simulated to address the questions raised in
the introduction. In so doing, we proceed in three stages. We start with structurally estimating
the model. We then calibrate its parameters on the results of the estimation and we validate the
calibration. Finally, we use the calibrated model to investigate the effects of different integration
scenarios.
6See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004), and Chaney (2006) for similar results
derived from different models.
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We consider 11 EU countries. One of them, France, is divided into the 21 NUTS2 regions. This
gives 31 units of analysis (‘economies’). In the structural estimation stage, we first use geographical
and trade data for the year 2000 to recover the trade freeness matrix Ps from the gravity equations
(17). We compute the determinant and the co-factors of P appearing in equation (12). The bilateral
trade freeness parameters ρlhs for French regions are reconstructed from aggregate (country-level)
figures, based on the assumption that the elasticity of trade with respect to distance is invariant to
the type (international vs intra-national) of trade. In Section 7 we provide some evidence on the
robustness of our results to that hypothesis. Second, we combine the database on manufacturing
firms belonging to 11 EU countries used by Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) with more
detailed data on French firms to estimate firm-level total factor productivities (TFP) for the year
2000. From such productivities we recover two additional elements of equation (12): the shape
parameter of the underlying Pareto distributions (ks) and the MxS endogenous domestic cutoffs
(chs ) of our economy-sector pairs. Finally, using the computed values of Ps, ks and chs together with
data on population Lh, we solve (11) to obtain the index of absolute advantage and entry barriers
ψls/f ls (up to a sector-specific constant related to the unobservable γs).
At the validation stage, we compare our model’s predictions with actual data on the distribution
of productivity and sales in the population of manufacturing firms. Our model fits reasonably well
the data on the share and size advantage of exporters, and the size distribution of manufacturing
firms. In relative terms our fit is also comparable to that of Bernard et al. (2003). Interestingly,
as noted by Eaton et al. (2004), the French and US manufacturing sector are quite similar in
a number of respects, and in particular export intensity. This allows us to further compare our
model’s predictions to US data when these are more reliable than their French counterparts.
Finally, at the simulation stage, we run a counterfactual analysis on the calibrated model. In
particular, we simulate the changes in productivity induced by different trade costs by recomputing
chs for alternative freeness matrices Ps. Three scenarios are considered. In the first one, inter-
national trade costs are set to be prohibitive (ρlhs = 0 for l 6= h and l and h belonging to two
different countries). This provides us with an assessment of the ‘costs of non-Europe’ and allows
us to replicate the results of Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) in a world in which France
is now divided into 21 sub-national economies (NUTS2). The second experiment (‘costs of non-
France’) features a world where intra-national French trade costs are prohibitive, but French regions
can still trade with other EU countries (ρlhs = 0 for l and h being two different French regions).
Lastly, in the third scenario (‘United Europe’) international trade frictions not related to distance
(captured by border effects) are eliminated. This experiment roughly corresponds to a 34% decrease
of international trade costs (τ lhs ), and sheds some light on gains from further behind-the-border
integration in the EU.
4 Data
In our empirical analysis we take advantage of different datasets. For country-level productivity es-
timations we extensively use the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau van Dijk. This dataset
gives (harmonized) yearly balance-sheet information on the biggest 250,000 European firms for the
period 1994-2003. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only dataset that provides compara-
ble individual figures for a relatively large group of economies. In particular, Amadeus provides
information on value added, fixed assets (capital), sales, and the cost of materials (intermediates
consumption) in thousands of euros, as well as on the number of employees. We focus on manufac-
turing firms in western Europe for the year 2000. We chose that year because of the quality of the
data and the fact that no major economic change took place. We consider only those economies for
which a reasonable data coverage exists. We eliminate missing values and extreme observations,
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defined as having either a capital/employees or value added/employees ratio which is out of the
range identified by the 1st and the 99th percentile. This leaves us with a sample of 22,120 firms
across 11 countries as listed in Table 1.7
Table 1: Data coverage across countries for the year 2000: Amadeus only.
Economy initials Economy Frequency Percent
BE Belgium 1557 7.04
DE Germany 385 1.74
DK Denmark 309 1.40
ES Spain 2730 12.34
FI Finland 529 2.39
FR France 3956 17.88
GB Great Britain 4514 20.41
IT Italy 5735 25.93
NL Netherlands 861 3.89
PT Portugal 156 0.71
SE Sweden 1388 6.27
Total 22120 100
As one can see in the table, data coverage for Germany, which is the biggest EU economy, is
rather poor. This is the reason why we complement our Amadeus data with information coming
from the MIP (Mannheim Innovation Panel) database on German firms provided by the Zentrum
fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW). The MIP database has relatively smaller firms than
Amadeus. However, the productivity of German firms in the two samples is not very different and
both samples reveal that Germany is the most productive economy. The MIP contains information
on value added, employment and input consumption. The capital variable is reconstructed by using
the book value of capital in 1998, adding investments at the end of the period and applying the
relevant deflators. After eliminating missing as well as extreme observations, the MIP database
provides us with roughly 700 additional firms. Although our results are virtually the same when
we use the Amadeus data only, the actual sample we rely on for country-level productivity estima-
tions contains those additional firms. Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the combined
Amadeus-MIP database are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the country-level dataset (Amadeus and MIP).
Variable N. firms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 22801 146008.9 1739573 2 162000000
Value added 22801 47083.5 511309 18 44500000
Capital 22801 72865.69 937859.3 8 89100000
Intermed. consumpt. 22801 57920.58 428622.7 1 26900000
Employees 22801 667.84 6027.05 1 449594
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
In order to recover sub-national French productivity figures, we use the EAE (Enquete An-
7Sample statistics indicate that observations are missing at random within each country suggesting that there is
no sample representativeness issue.
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nuelle Entreprises) database provided by the SESSI (Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles,
French Ministry of Industry) and the SCEES (Service Central des Enqueˆtes et Etudes Statistiques,
French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries), under the authorization of the French Conseil Na-
tional de l’Information Statistique (CNIS). This database provides detailed information on the
balance sheets and location of all firms with more than 20 employees, as well as on a stratified
sample of those with less than 20 employees. After eliminating missing as well as extreme obser-
vations, the EAE database provides us with 23,203 additional firms for the year 2000. Descriptive
statistics of the main variables of the EAE dataset used in the analysis are provided in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the French dataset (EAE).
Variable N. Firms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 23203 29904.14 304830.6 83 29900000
Value added 23203 8078.472 65215.5 40 5303471
Capital 23203 10333.84 108842.4 0.15 13000000
Intermed. consumpt. 23203 12716.59 195236.4 0 19900000
Employees 23203 137.2749 498.4147 1 27966
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
As a benchmark, we estimate firm-level productivity in the year 2000 by means of simple OLS
regressions. In Section 7 we further extend our analysis by implementing the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) estimation method.
Turning to the industry disaggregation, we work with a 17-sector breakdown of manufacturing
activities that excludes the ‘Petroleum and Coal’ industry for both data availability and con-
fidentiality reasons.8 The loss in terms of firms is modest (53 for the EAE, and 129 for the
Amadeus+MIP) and we checked that this omission does not significantly alter our results. The
actual industry disaggregation used is detailed in Table 4.
The core data we use to compute trade costs are provided by the Centre d’Etude Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The dataset, used in Mayer and Zignago (2005),
comprises trade and production figures in an ISIC 3-digit classification that is consistent across a
large set of countries over the 1976-2001 period.9 To estimate the freeness of trade ρlhs from the
gravity equation (17), we complement trade and production data with geographical variables such
as bilateral distances (that we have elaborated using a GIS software, as CEPII data do not include
distances between French regions), and common language indicators (provided by CEPII).
To recover the bilateral trade costs for our 31 economies (10 countries plus 21 NUTS2 French
regions) in 2000, we use international trade flows between 15 European countries (our 11 countries
plus Austria, Greece, Ireland and Norway) in the years 1999-2001. We use a larger number of
countries and a longer time span to obtain more accurate measures. With the coefficients estimated
in our gravity equations, and in particular that of distance, we can then compute trade costs for
French regions by simply imposing that the same distance decay effect applies to intra-national
trade.
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables we will use in the
gravity equation. The data are organized by flows and the number of observations (11,475) is given
8There are in fact only 53 French firms in the EAE database that belong to this sector and they are distributed in
just a few regions. We decided to drop this sector in order to prevent firms’ identification and to restrict the analysis
to industries that are present in all economies.
9For details, see http : //www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm.
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Table 4: Sectoral disaggregation
Industry code Industry description
1 Food beverages and tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel except footwear
4 Leather products and footwear
5 Wood products except furniture
6 Paper products
7 Printing and Publishing
9 Chemicals
10 Rubber and plastic
11 Other non-metallic mineral products
12 Metallic products
13 Fabricated metal products
14 Machinery except electrical
15 Electric machinery
16 Professional and scientific equipment
17 Transport equipment
18 Other manufacturing
by the number of origin countries (15), times the number of destination countries (15), times the
number of sectors (17), times the number of years (3).
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables used.
N. observ Mean St. Dev Min Max
Exports 11475 741204.9 4247073 0 113000000
Common Language 11475 0.06 0.24 0 1
distw 11475 729.44 378.53 69.29 1782.32
Population 31 11398.37 20014.15 709.97 82211.51
Note: Exports are in thousands of US dollars while distances distw are in miles and population is in
thousands of inhabitants. The common language variable is a dummy variable.
The variable Exports in the table corresponds to trade flows (both internal and external to a
country) in thousands of US dollars. The common language variable is a dummy indicating whether
a couple of countries share a common official language.10
The distance variable distw is in miles and it has been constructed using the same methodol-
ogy for both countries and French regions. In particular, our weighted distance distw uses small
regions (NUTS3) data on great circle distances (based on latitude and longitude of the centroid of
each region) and GDP (in 2000) inside each economy. The basic idea is to calculate the distance
between two economies as the weighted average bilateral distance between their subunits with the
10In the CEPII database, there are two alternative common language indicators based on different definitions. One
indicator considers that two economies share a common language as long as at least 20 per cent of the two populations
speak that language. The other one is similar, but the threshold is now between 9 per cent and 20 per cent. We
experimented with both indicators getting similar results.
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corresponding weights determined by the shares of those small regions in the overall economy GDP.
This procedure can be used in a totally consistent way for internal and external distances of both
a country and a region. Specifically, following Head and Mayer (2002), we calculate the distance
between economies l and h as:11
dlh =
⎛
⎝X
p∈l
X
r∈h
(GDP p/GDP l)(GDP r/GDP h) (dpr)θ
⎞
⎠
1/θ
(18)
where GDP p (GDP r) designates the GDP of NUTS3 region p (r) belonging to economy l (h).
Economies l and h can be either French regions or EU countries included in the analysis. However,
only country distances are needed (see Section 5.1) in the estimation of the gravity equation (17).
Therefore, summary statistics reported in Table 5 refer only to the latter. The distances between
French regions are used in a second step in order to determine regional trade freeness and perform
our simulations. The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of trade flows to bilateral distance dpr
which, for the distw variable, is set equal to 1. The internal distance of a NUTS3 region (dpp) is
calculated from its area as dpp = (2/3)
p
areap/π like in Head and Mayer (2002).12
In Section 7, we perform a robustness experiment using merchandise trade data on both imports
and exports between French regions and our set of European countries, that come from the French
Ministry of Transport (Syste`me d’Information sur les Transports de Marchandises, or SITRAM,
database). These data should in principle allow us to get a more detailed pattern of the trade
between our 31 economies. However, matching the NSTR (Nomenclature for Transport Statistics)
product classification of these data with our sectoral classification sometimes proves problematic
(especially for the Food industry). Furthermore, we do not have reliable data on local French
production by sector and for both reasons we decided to use the CEPII international trade data
for the baseline estimation of the gravity equation (17).
Finally, data on population for our 31 economies come from the New Cronos database provided
by EUROSTAT. They refer to the year 2000 and the unit is thousands of inhabitants.
5 Calibration
To gauge the impact of trade openness on domestic productivity, we need to recover the parameters
of the model and in particular those of equation (12).
5.1 Trade costs
The starting point of our estimation strategy is the gravity equation (17). To estimate it we use
country-level trade flows in order to get the freeness-of-trade matrix Ps, whose generic element is
ρlhs ≡
¡
τ lhs
¢−ks . From equation (17), one can easily see that the only term that depends on both
l and h is ρlhs . In fact, the other terms either depend on the origin country only (N lE,sψ
l
s), or on
the destination country only (Lh
¡
chs
¢ks+2), or they are constant (1/[2γs (ks + 2)]). Therefore, as
in Head and Mayer (2004) and Hummels (1999), one can isolate the effects of these latter terms
11In their original formulation, Head and Mayer (2002) use population instead of GDP data. However, we believe
GDP is a much better measure to feature local demand.
12This latter formula models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a stylized geography
where all producers are centrally located and the consumers are uniformly distributed over a disk-shaped economy.
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by means of dummies for origin (EX ls) and destination (IMhs ) countries.13 As to the freeness of
trade, we follow Head and Mayer (2004), assuming that ρlhs = exp(β
h + λ Langlh) (dlh)δs if l 6= h
and ρlhs = (dlh)δs if l = h, where dlh is distance between l and h, β
h is a coefficient capturing the
fall in trade due to crossing country h border, and Langlh is a dummy variable that takes value one
if l and h share a common language. In other words, as is standard in the gravity literature, trade
costs are a power function of distance, while crossing a border and not sharing the same language
impose additional costs. Taking the log of equation (17) we thus get the following regression:
ln(EXP lhs ) = EX
l
s + IM
h
s + δs ln(d
lh) + βh Borderlh + λ LanglhBorderlh + lhs (19)
where Borderlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l 6= h (‘border effect’). Having
estimated (19) at the country level, we then reconstruct trade freeness between a French region l
and country h as ρlhs = exp(β
h + λ Langlh) (dlh)δs , while the trade freeness between two French
regions l and h is defined as ρlhs = exp(λ Langlh) (dlh)δs , i.e, there is no border effect inside France.
In estimating (19), we use data from years 1999, 2000, and 2001 to run a single country-based
regression in which we also put year dummies. The coefficient on distances is industry-specific
while the border effect is economy specific. We do not consider economy-industry-specific border
effects, because they impose too many parameters and their estimation would be inaccurate. It
is important to stress that the specification used to estimate ρlhs gives economy-industry-sector
specific transportation costs and that in general ρlhs 6= ρhls due to border effects. Moreover, ρll is
always less than one due to internal distances.
In our econometric specification the sectoral variation of trade costs is captured by the δs
coefficients. These estimated distance elasticities are reported in Table 6. In particular, ‘Printing
and publishing’ are the least tradable goods, while ‘Textiles’ as well as ’Leather products and
footwear’ are characterized by the smallest trade costs. The estimated elasticities (average δs =
−1.68) are in line with previous findings for Europe by Head and Mayer (2004) - average δs = −1.38
- and Chen (2004) - average δs = −1.68.
5.2 Total factor productivity
After calculating ρlhs , we still have to recover (for each sector) the shape parameter of the underlying
Pareto distribution of productivity (ks), and the M endogenous domestic cutoff chs . For this we
need to estimate the distributions of firm-level productivities for all sectors and economies. As a
benchmark, we rely on simple OLS estimations based on the regression
ln(V Ai) = const+ a ln(CAPi) + b ln(EMPLi) + εi (20)
where V Ai is value added, CAPi is capital (fixed assets), EMPLi is the number of employees of firm
i and the sector/economy indices have been dropped to make the notation lighter. The estimated
productivity of firm i is thus ˆProdi,OLS = exp( ˆconst+ εˆi). The OLS estimator notoriously suffers
from a simultaneity bias, but using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator yields very similar
results, which we report in Section 7.
Using equation (20), we first use the Amadeus/MIP database (in which France is considered
as a single economy) to calculate country-level comparable productivities coming from the same
database. Our OLS estimations of productivity are carried out separately for each of the 17
manufacturing industries, each time for all countries. Therefore, we assume de facto that the same
13This ‘fixed effect’ approach does not suffer from the specification problems of standard gravity equations discussed
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In particular, these authors show that fixed effects regressions generate
parameter estimates that are very similar to those obtained using their multilateral resistance terms.
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Table 6: Sectoral trade elasticities with respect to distance
Industry code Industry description δs
1 Food beverages and tobacco -1.8739
2 Textiles -1.1218
3 Wearing apparel except footwear -1.4483
4 Leather products and footwear -1.1913
5 Wood products except furniture -2.1968
6 Paper products -1.5381
7 Printing and Publishing -2.6793
9 Chemicals -1.5035
10 Rubber and plastic -1.7645
11 Other non-metallic mineral products -1.8935
12 Metallic products -1.5784
13 Fabricated metal products -1.8642
14 Machinery except electrical -1.6296
15 Electric machinery -1.2096
16 Professional and scientific equipment -1.6514
17 Transport equipment -1.6065
18 Other manufacturing -1.8721
Average -1.6837
technology is used in all economies for a given industry, up to a scale factor (or Hicks-neutral, factor-
augmenting technological lead).14 With ˆProdi,OLS in our hands, we can easily estimate the shape
parameter ks of the Pareto distribution (which is sector-specific only) using the following property.
Consider a random variable X (our productivity) with observed cumulative distribution F (X). If
the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks, then the OLS estimate of the slope
parameter in the regression of ln(1− F (X)) on ln(X) plus a constant is a consistent estimator of
−ks and the corresponding R2 is close to one.15 Table 7 shows the estimated ks and the R2 of our
regressions by sector. For all sectors the R2 is far above 0.8, which shows that the Pareto is a fairly
good approximation of the underlying productivity distributions, and the average ks is estimated
to be close to 2. Large values of ks characterize sectors in which the productivity distribution
is skewed towards relatively small and inefficient firms (‘Leather products and footwear’, ‘Wood
products except furniture’, ‘Rubber and plastic’, ‘Fabricated metal products’, ‘Machinery except
electrical’). Small values of ks are associated, instead, with an even distribution of firms across
all productivity levels and sizes (‘Wearing apparel except footwear’, ‘Chemicals’, ‘Professional and
scientific equipment’).16
In a second step we calculate productivities for the larger sample of French firms contained in
the EAE database and we re-scale these productivities in order to match France’s average sectoral
14Indeed, the evidence provided by Trefler (1995) supports this assumption for all countries in our sample except
Portugal. In unreported estimations, where we exclude Portugal, we find qualitatively similar results to the ones we
report when Portugal is included in the sample. The fact that we do not carry out separate estimations by economy
has strong empirical advantages. First, it allows us to have a better measure of productivity as for some economies
there are very few economy-sector observations. Second, it avoids the following problem. If we found the sum of the
coefficients a and b to differ between two economies, then our estimated average productivity would turn out to be
higher in the economy with the lower sum simply because this would map into a higher value of the constant.
15See Norman, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994).
16We have also tried alternative estimation techniques for ks, such as the inverse of the standard error of ln(X).
Overall results are very similar.
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Table 7: Sectoral ks and the R2 from the regression method
Industry code Industry description ks R2
1 Food beverages and tobacco 2.004 0.898
2 Textiles 2.248 0.872
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 1.804 0.904
4 Leather products and footwear 2.345 0.893
5 Wood products except furniture 2.454 0.871
6 Paper products 1.966 0.827
7 Printing and Publishing 1.988 0.898
9 Chemicals 1.811 0.848
10 Rubber and plastic 2.372 0.868
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 2.156 0.826
12 Metallic products 2.206 0.848
13 Fabricated metal products 2.450 0.875
14 Machinery except electrical 2.346 0.898
15 Electric machinery 1.930 0.881
16 Professional and scientific equipment 1.844 0.856
17 Transport equipment 2.062 0.861
18 Other manufacturing 2.128 0.900
Average 2.124 0.872
productivity as calculated from the first step.17 Doing that, we are then able to calculate sector
specific productivities for each of the 21 NUTS2 French regions considered that are comparable
with those obtained in the first step. With all sector-economy average productivities in our hands,
we can easily calculate the cutoffs chs . In the model, they represent the highest cost (or equivalently
the inverse of the lowest productivity) of active firms in an economy. The maximum likelihood
estimator of the cutoff for a Pareto distribution is the minimum observed value. However, this is
probably a rather unreliable method to implement with micro data because of extreme observations.
Consequently, we prefer to use a moment estimator based on the formula of the mean of a Pareto.
Specifically, if X (our productivity) follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter ks and
cutoff x then its mean is E(X) = x ks/(ks − 1). Using the economy-sector average productivities
and the previously estimated shape parameters, this formula can be inverted to recover all the
productivity cutoffs, which are simply scaled average productivities. Finally, cost cutoffs, which
are needed in equation (12), are simply equal to the inverse of productivity cutoffs.
Table 8 shows average (across firms) OLS productivity by country obtained in the first step,
as well as per capita GDP in PPS (EU11=100).18 As one can see, the two measures are closely
related, with the correlation being 0.61. The Table shows that our OLS estimates of productivity are
generally in line with aggregate figures. A notable exception is Germany, whose omission increases
the correlation between productivity and GDP to 0.88. The reason is that both the Amadeus and
the MIP databases have a strong bias towards West German firms, which are known to be much
more productive than East German ones. However, our simulations are not very sensitive to the
exclusion of Germany, so we decided to keep it in the analysis.
17Interestingly, the ks that would be obtained from the EAE database are very close (average=2.519) to those
obtained with Amadeus (average=2.124).
18Per capita income in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) should be a better measure of ‘physical’ productivity
because it deflates nominal values by country-specific price indices. Data come from the New Cronos database
provided by Eurostat.
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Table 8: Productivity across countries: OLS estimations.
Country name Country initials OLS Productivity Per capita GDP in PPS (EU11=100)
Belgium BE 43.40 104.30
Germany DE 63.82 101.60
Denmark DK 50.26 114.56
Spain ES 32.60 83.78
Finland FI 37.19 102.59
France FR 40.33 103.13
Great Britain GB 39.05 102.14
Italy IT 40.50 99.35
Netherlands NL 42.43 108.53
Portugal PT 24.33 73.08
Sweden SE 34.57 106.91
Average 40.06 100.00
Note: Compared to Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006), the industry ‘Petroleum and Coal’ is not
considered here. This is why the numbers reported are slightly different.
Table 9 shows average (across firms) of our OLS productivities by French region, as well as per
capita Gross Regional Product GRP (France=100) provided by the French National Statistic Insti-
tute (INSEE). Again, productivity averages are in line with aggregate numbers with the correlation
being 0.87.
6 Simulation
So far, we have computed ρlhs (and thus |Ps| as well as
¯¯
Clhs
¯¯
), ks and chs . We also have Lh, which is
the population of county h. We still do not know γs, ψ
l
s and f ls. However, since we know everything
about (11) except the bundling parameter ψls/(γsf ls), we can choose its value to fit that equation
(by sector) for each of our 31 economies. The calibration of the model is now complete.
With the (ψls/γsf ls)’s we can finally simulate the model and evaluate the changes in the chs ’s
(the equilibrium cutoff production costs) induced by changes in the freeness of trade using equation
(12).
In particular, we consider the three following scenarios:
1. A situation in which international trade barriers are prohibitive (i.e. ρlhs = 0 for l and h
in different countries). This provides an assessment of the overall ‘costs of non-Europe’ as
measured by foregone productivity, were our 11 EU countries to become autarkic.
2. A situation in which intra-national French trade barriers are prohibitive (i.e. ρlhs = 0 for l
and h being two different French regions). This provides an assessment of the costs of losing
intra-national trade for our 21 French regional economies in a world where they still trade
with other EU countries (‘costs of non-France’). Again, these costs are measured by losses in
average productivity.
3. A situation in which trade impediments coming from border effects βh are removed (‘United
Europe’). This provides an assessment of the gains from intra-EU trade in terms of average
productivity that could accrue from full behind-the-border integration in the EU.
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Table 9: Productivity across French regions: OLS estimations.
Region name NUTS 2 Code OLS Productivity Per capita GRP (France=100)
Ile de France FR10 57.27 154.80
Champagne-Ardennes FR21 41.09 93.55
Picardie FR22 41.19 80.65
Haute-Normandie FR23 41.18 90.86
Centre FR24 40.71 88.46
Basse-Normandie FR25 38.08 81.52
Bourgogne FR26 38.88 87.46
Nord-Pas de Calais FR31 43.79 77.09
Lorraine FR41 42.21 81.48
Alsace FR42 42.67 98.08
Franche-Comte´ FR43 39.82 87.66
Pays de la Loire FR51 40.91 89.30
Bretagne FR52 34.71 85.22
Poitou-Charentes FR53 37.58 81.58
Aquitaine FR61 39.37 87.98
Midi-Pyre´ne´es FR62 40.42 86.38
Limousin FR63 36.45 80.96
Rhoˆne-Alpes FR71 46.21 100.28
Auvergne FR72 37.50 82.75
Languedoc-Roussillon FR81 36.52 76.10
PACA FR82 43.11 91.05
Average 44.28 100.00
6.1 The Model’s fit
Before turning to counterfactuals, it is important to evaluate the capacity of the model to reproduce
facts on the distribution of firms’ sales and export that are not directly related to the calibrated
(ψls/γsf ls) and the estimated (ks, ρlhs , chs ) parameters. We focus on France for three reasons. First
of all, France is the core country of our analysis of inter- vs intra-national trade. Second, we have
better data coverage and quality for French firms in the Amadeus+MIP database, and we can
further complement this information with the EAE database. Third, Eaton et al. (2004) provide
evidence that French and US firms are very similar in terms of share of exporters, export intensity,
etc. We exploit this similarity to give a richer description of the moments of various statistics in
the population, referring to data from the US Census of Manufactures, as reported by Bernard et
al. (2003).
1. The share of firms that export. In 2000, the share of exporters in the whole population
of French manufacturing firms was equal to 22.26 %. This figure can be considered as fairly
stable over time.19 Eaton et al. (2004) report that 20% of the whole population of French
manufacturing firms (roughly 40,000 out of 200,000) were exporters in 1986. This can also be
compared to a 21% share of US firms exporting in 1992. Based on our calibration, 14.73% of
French firms should export in 2000, which is reasonably close to the real share. For the sake
of comparison, in Bernard et al. (2003) the simulated share of US exporters in 1992 is 51%
compared with the observed 21%. Moreover, the region with the highest share of exporters is
19We thank Benjamin Nefussi of CREST-INSEE for computing this figure for us, using the appropriate dataset.
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the “Nord-Pas de Calais” close to the border with Belgium - that Eaton et al. (2004) shows
to be the most popular foreign destination for French exporters. “Ile de France” (the Greater
Paris region) comes a close second.
2. The size advantage of exporters. When size is measured by domestic sales, exporters in
the EAE dataset are 4.33 times greater than non-exporters. This compares to a predicted
size advantage of 3.85 in our model. For the US, Bernard et al. (2003) report that exporters
sell 4.8 times more than non-exporters on the US market. The top three regions in terms of
this ratio are again “Nord-Pas de Calais”, “Champagne-Ardennes” and “Ile de France”.
3. The productivity advantage of exporters. In the EAE database, the productivity ad-
vantage of exporters over firms selling only on the domestic market is equal to 27.32%. This
figure is likely to be underestimated since the database only covers French firms with more
than 20 employees, many of which (73%) are exporters. For the US Bernard et al. (2003)
report a 33% advantage. They use this difference in averages to calibrate their productivity
variance parameter θ (which is closely related to our ks), for which they find a value of 3.6. In
contrast, our model predicts a 132% productivity advantage of exporting firms, which seems
far too high. However, by re-scaling the ks’s from an average of 2.10 to an average of 3.73
we obtain a 33% productivity advantage, and we show in section 7 that our estimates are
fairly robust to changes in the ks of similar magnitude. “Nord-Pas de Calais” “Champagne-
Ardennes” (also on the Belgian border) and “Ile de France” rank first, second and third in
terms of the lowest productivity advantage of exporters.
4. The fraction of revenues from export. Here we exploit the observation by Eaton et al.
(2004) that the distribution of exporters by their share of export revenue over total revenue
is quite similar in the US and in France.20 In Table 10 we compare the actual US distribution
of this statistic with the predictions in Bernard et al. (2003) and our predictions. The second
column, taken from Bernard et al. (2003), shows the actual percentage of exporting US firms
getting a given share of their revenues from exports in 1992. The third column reports the
simulated export intensity of US firms by Bernard et al. (2003), while the fourth column
shows the results of our simulations for France. The actual distribution of export intensity
is strongly skewed with 66% of the exporters getting less than 10% of their revenues from
abroad. This feature is nicely captured in the simulations of Bernard et al. (2003), even
though virtually no firm should sell more than 30% abroad. Our simulations do not match
the high share of exporters declaring very little exports, but are still able to predict that few
firms will get more than 30% of their revenues from abroad. The fit of our simulations to
actual export intensity could be improved if we considered smaller values of ks (but at the
cost of a poorer match of the productivity advantage of exporters). Overall the model of
Bernard et al. (2003) does a better job in predicting export intensity. Interestingly enough,
the distribution of export intensity in Paris is very skewed in our simulations with 53% of
exporters selling less than 20% abroad.
5. Variability in size. In the EAE database, the standard deviation of the log of domestic
sales is 1.30, compared to 1.08 in our simulations. In our model heterogeneity in underlying
efficiency explains 69% of the variance across sectors in log domestic sales. For the sake of
comparison, in Bernard et al. (2003) the actual and simulated standard deviation in log
domestic sales are 1.67 and 0.84 respectively; therefore heterogeneity in productivity explains
20The only noticeable exception is that in France more firms (but still less than 3% of exporters) make more than
90% of their revenues abroad.
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Table 10: Export Intensity
Export intensity of exporters in % Observed US Simulated BEJK Our Simulations
0 to 10 66 76 15.6
10 to 20 16 19 19.4
20 to 30 7.7 4.2 15.2
30 to 40 4.4 0.0 11.6
40 to 50 2.4 0.0 10.3
50 to 60 1.5 0.0 9.5
60 to 70 1 0.0 7.9
70 to 80 0.6 0.0 7.8
80 to 90 0.5 0.0 2.7
90 to 100 0.7 0.0 0.0
only 25% of the variance. As suggested by these authors, the unexplained variability could
come from heterogeneity in tastes and demand weights across products, which both models
fail to take into account.
6. Variability in productivity. In our framework, the variability of productivity (captured
by ks) is obtained through TFP estimations. The overall standard deviation in our log-TFP
estimates is 0.58. This figure is roughly comparable to the standard deviation of the log of
value added per worker directly observed in US Census data, which is equal to 0.75. While
we calibrate our model on this statistic, Bernard et al. (2003) predict it, and find a value
of 0.35, thus explaining only 22% of the variance in the log of productivity by heterogeneity
in the underlying technology. To account for this underprediction, they argue that measure-
ment errors in the US Census data can cause excess observed heterogeneity.21 However, our
methodology can shed additional light on their underprediction. Indeed a possible explana-
tion is that they do not break down manufacturing into different sectors. By doing that in our
framework, we find that the average within-sector standard deviation is 0.45. This amounts
to productivity differences across sectors explaining as much as 40% of the overall variability
in our framework.
In summary, not only does our model pick up some well-known qualitative features of plant-
level data on export and productivity, but its calibration also goes quite far in fitting observed
magnitudes. This goodness of fit retrospectively lends additional credence to the simulations in
Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006), where the fit to export and sales data was even better.
6.2 Prohibitive international trade barriers and the ‘costs of non-Europe’
Our first experiment consists in simulating productivity levels with non-Europe, understood as the
imposition of prohibitive international trade barriers between the 11 EU countries, all else equal.
In order to get an idea of the magnitude of this effect at the country level and to evaluate how
our results are sensitive to the splitting up of France into 21 sub-national units, Table 11 compares
the average (across sectors) ‘costs of non-Europe’ by country in our 31-economy simulation to
21This is why they did not recover their variance parameter θ from actual productivity data in the first place, as
we do.
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those of a simpler 11-country simulation in which we treat France as a single economy.22 Costs are
measured as minus percentage changes in mean productivity with respect to the observed value
in the year 2000. In the 31-economy model, the figure for France denotes an average taken across
regions. Detailed ‘costs of non-Europe’ for each French region are reported in the next subsection
where we compare them to the ‘costs of non-France’
Table 11: The loss in average productivity from non-Europe in the two models : OLS estimations.
Country name Country code Cost of Non-Europe (%): 31-economy model Cost of Non-Europe (%): 11-country model
Belgium BE 18.78 17.14
Germany DE 16.94 24.06
Denmark DK 21.84 22.29
Spain ES 10.40 10.31
Finland FI 11.98 12.80
France FR 8.08 13.20
Great Britain GB 3.22 3.40
Italy IT 6.58 6.98
Netherlands NL 13.99 12.52
Portugal PT 3.27 4.89
Sweden SE 12.06 12.02
Average 11.56 12.69
Based on our simulations, the elimination of international trade reduces average productivity
by 12.69% in the 11-country model and by 11.56% in the 31-economy model. These are sizeable
numbers and suggest that the selection effect is an important channel through which the benefits
of international trade materialize. In addition, the two estimates by country are very close to
each other in all countries but France. The difference in the two numbers for France can be
attributed to our method of computing within-economy distances, based on a disk-shaped economy
approximation and the assumption of uniformly distributed consumers. Due to this approximation,
we are likely to overestimate the real distance between sellers and consumers, thus reducing the
importance of the ‘intra-national’ selection effect relative to the ’international’ channel. As the
approximation is less accurate when we consider France as a single economy, it is not surprising
that we find a greater effect of the international selection effect in that framework. In this respect,
splitting up France into 21 economies should provide more accurate results than in Del Gatto, Mion
and Ottaviano (2006).
6.3 Prohibitive inter- and intra-national trade barriers, losses from autarky, and the
‘costs of non-France’
We now compare the magnitude of the costs of non-Europe and costs of non-France for our 21
French regions. Results are shown in Table 12.
Costs of non-Europe Column five of Table 12 reports the ‘costs of non-Europe’ defined as
minus percentage changes in mean productivity between the observed value in the year 2000 - 1/(chs
trade) - and the simulated scenario - 1/(chs no EU trade). 23 For France as a whole, inhibiting
international trade induces a productivity loss of 8.08%. This corresponds, using equation (13), to
a 10.31% increase in average prices and markups and a 19.61% (7.12%) increase in average profits
(quantities).
22The 11 countries simulation exercise has originally been performed in Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006).
Their estimations are slightly different from ours because we exclude the ‘Petroleum and Coal’ industry.
23As already said, the mean of the Pareto distribution 1/c is just a scaling of the lower bound of the support and
this applies also to the distribution of costs c. We can thus compute percentage changes in average productivity
simply as percentage changes in the relevant cutoff.
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Table 12: Average productivity losses from ’non-Europe’ and ’non-France’ (French regions): OLS
estimations.
Region name NUTS 2 code chhs trade c
hh
s no EU trade ‘costs of non-Europe’ (%) c
hh
s no FR trade ‘costs of non-France’ (%)
Ile de France FR10 0.042 0.044 -0.06 0.046 5.31
Champagne-Ardennes FR21 0.052 0.063 13.35 0.081 32.99
Picardie FR22 0.053 0.064 12.42 0.080 31.76
Haute-Normandie FR23 0.051 0.056 8.04 0.067 21.10
Centre FR24 0.053 0.061 10.07 0.079 31.80
Basse-Normandie FR25 0.059 0.067 12.58 0.078 23.77
Bourgogne FR26 0.053 0.056 5.48 0.081 33.12
Nord-Pas de Calais FR31 0.052 0.057 6.78 0.060 11.67
Lorraine FR41 0.052 0.058 11.87 0.067 22.50
Alsace FR42 0.05 0.054 8.84 0.064 21.95
Franche-Comte´ FR43 0.054 0.058 8.9 0.077 29.87
Pays de la Loire FR51 0.052 0.055 5.61 0.070 25.50
Bretagne FR52 0.053 0.062 8.15 0.069 22.39
Poitou-Charentes FR53 0.055 0.058 5.32 0.079 30.06
Aquitaine FR61 0.051 0.059 13.09 0.069 25.63
Midi-Pyre´ne´es FR62 0.051 0.056 9.31 0.069 24.75
Limousin FR63 0.056 0.06 2.63 0.085 32.34
Rhoˆne-Alpes FR71 0.049 0.051 4.52 0.062 20.17
Auvergne FR72 0.053 0.055 4.34 0.078 30.22
Languedoc-Roussillon FR81 0.053 0.058 9.01 0.070 25.48
PACA FR82 0.047 0.052 9.45 0.059 20.02
Average 0.052 0.057 8.08 0.071 24.88
Looking at detailed regional patterns uncovers a rich variability in the losses ranging from the
-0.06% of Ile de France (the Greater Paris region) to the 13.35% of Champagne-Ardennes. The
overall French average of 8.08% thus blurs a complex regional picture revealed by our simulations,
suggesting that inter-regional disparities should not be neglected in this type of analysis. To what
extent does geography account for these differences? Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of
the ‘costs of non-Europe’, while Figure 2 plots a measure of the accessibility of each region to
international trade. This measure is equal to the average (across sectors and foreign origins) of
the estimated ρlhs excluding the ρlls : more precisely, ρ¯h =
P
s
P
l ρˆ
lh
s /((M − 1)S), for l 6= h. The
correlation is positive, as expected, but rather low (0.16). However, excluding Paris, which is
something of an outlier in the data, increases the correlation to 0.27. While geography has some
explanatory power, these findings suggest other determinants of the regional variability of the
‘costs of non-Europe’, namely differences in the underlying industry technology and entry barriers
(as captured by the parameters ψls/(γsf ls)). In the model, economies having a better technology or
lower entry costs enjoy greater gains from international trade (and therefore higher ‘costs of non-
Europe’). We can observe this in the particular case of the Paris region. The (inferred) underlying
manufacturing technology in this region is found to be the worst in France (lowest ψls/(γsf ls)), while
Paris has the highest observed productivity (see Table 9). In other words, once controlled for the
size and density of the local market (relatively very high in Paris), and its accessibility to foreign
markets, by means of equation (12), the model reveals that Paris is not very productive in the
manufacturing sector. The high observed productivity is essentially due to the very strong internal
competitive environment, that fosters selection of the best firms. That is why Paris would even
slightly gain (negative cost) if trade with other very competitive EU firms were to be inhibited.
Costs of non-France The last column of Table 12 reports the ‘costs of non-France’, defined as
minus percentage changes in mean productivity between the value observed in the year 2000 and
the counterfactual value of 1/(chs , which we respectively denote by chs trade and chs no FR trade).
For France as a whole, inhibiting intra-national trade would cause a productivity loss of 24.88%.
This loss corresponds to a 36.03% increase in average prices and markups and a 69.28% (23.03%)
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increase in average profits (quantities).
Interestingly, the difference between the productivity losses coming from the two channels does
not seem to come from specialisation in intra-national trade. Indeed, French exports to our 10
destination countries account (in the year 2000) for 61% of overall exports and 22% of overall
output in the French manufacturing sector, while 22, 5% of a French region’s production on average
is shipped to other French regions.24 Although the magnitude of the two types of trade is thus
virtually the same, competition from national firms has a stronger impact on regional productivity,
due to proximity. Put differently, even though French firms are exposed to foreign competition of
very productive firms in, say, Germany or Denmark, they are relatively far away from them (as
measured by our trade freeness estimations) compared to their French competitors.
We pause here by noting that France is a relatively large compact-shaped country. The relative
importance of intra- versus international competition in determining firm survival, selection and
productivity might vary in other European countries. Of course, results might be very different for
a smaller country like Belgium or for a long and narrow-shaped country like Italy. Another caveat
is that we are not considering (for lack of comparable data) trade with other important developed
(like the US and Japan) and developing (like India and China) countries. We must therefore be
underestimating the productivity gains from the international trade channel. Nevertheless our sim-
ulations do suggest that, while the general debate about competition focusses on the international
market, intra-national firm competition is still very important.
Disaggregating the ‘costs of non-France’ by region again reveals substantial variability in pro-
ductivity losses, ranging from the 5.31% of Ile de France to the 33.12% of Bourgogne. Figure 3
shows the spatial distribution of the ‘costs of non-France’, while Figure 4 plots a measure of the
accessibility of each region to intra-national trade as measured by the average (across sectors and
French regions) of the estimated ρlhs excluding ρlls . The correlation is now a bit lower than before
(0.10), but excluding Paris raises it substantially (0.55) again. These results suggest that accessi-
bility is (with the exception of Paris) relatively more important than differences in competitiveness
within French boundaries.
Table 13: Effect of intra- and international trade barriers on average French productivity by sector:
OLS estimations.
Industry code Industry description Costs of non-Europe (%) Costs of non-France (%) δs
1 Food beverages and tobacco 6.63 23.82 -1.8739
2 Textiles 15.93 28.71 -1.1218
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 15.07 33.02 -1.4483
4 Leather products and footwear 22.68 27.03 -1.1913
5 Wood products except furniture 5.45 17.54 -2.1968
6 Paper products 8.86 29.45 -1.5381
7 Printing and Publishing 2.31 13.01 -2.6793
9 Chemicals 6.92 30.84 -1.5035
10 Rubber and plastic -3.06 20.32 -1.7645
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 8.26 22.51 -1.8935
12 Metallic products 7.16 28.19 -1.5784
13 Fabricated metal products 2.63 17.06 -1.8642
14 Machinery except electrical 5.03 20.66 -1.6296
15 Electric machinery 5.2 32.44 -1.2096
16 Professional and scientific equipment 9.04 27.89 -1.6514
17 Transport equipment 9.93 27.78 -1.6065
18 Other manufacturing 7.92 22.63 -1.8721
Average 8.08 24.88 -1.6837
We now turn to a comparison of these costs for France across industries. Table 13 shows the
sectoral disaggregation of the average costs of non-Europe and of non-France for French regions.
24We thank Miren Lafourcade for computing this figure for us, using the intra-national commodity flow data from
the SITRAM database.
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As in Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006), these costs vary considerably across industries. This
result suggests that a simple one-sector macro perspective of trade and selection, as in Bernard
et al. (2003), is far from being satisfactory. Columns 3, 4 and 5 reveal a high correlation across
sectors between the costs of autarky and the elasticities of trade with respect to distance (δs). Both
the ‘costs of non-Europe’ and the ‘costs of non-France’ are highly correlated with these elasticities
(respectively 0.59 and 0.83). Therefore trade openness appears as a key factor to explain the
magnitude and competition and selection in each sector.
6.4 ‘United Europe’: removing border effects
We now compute counterfactual average productivity levels when the obstacles to trade that are
captured by border effects in our gravity equation (legal, informational, technical costs...) are
negligible. More precisely, we compute a new freeness of trade matrix and the corresponding cutoff
productivity levels, setting all βh = 0. This experiment corresponds to an (asymmetric) decrease
of trade costs by 34.02%.
This trade cost equivalent variation might seem quite large. However, our estimate of βh (the
average border effect taken across countries) is equal to −0.97, whose absolute value belongs to the
lower bound of recent studies.25 In this sense, our subsequent estimates of the productivity gains
from eliminating border effects should be considered as relatively ‘prudent’. Nevertheless, some
issues with respect to the interpretation of the elimination of border effects should be kept in mind
before we show our simulation results. First, divergent national interests and the political influence
of producer lobbies may prevent a complete integration process. Second, Wolf (2000) and Combes
et al (2005), provide evidence that border effects also exist within a country, making questionable
whether a ‘complete’ elimination of the international border effects is really feasible. Indeed, such
‘persistent’ border effects may not reflect any trade impediment but instead emerge as an empirical
artifact stemming from the co-location of industries with vertical linkages. In this respect, Chen
(2004) shows that the co-location mechanism has some impact on the estimation of border effects
across Europe.
Table 14 exhibits the magnitude of the average productivity gain for our 11 countries, while
Table 15 displays the same results for French regions.
Table 14 reveals considerable heterogeneity across countries, with productivity increases ranging
from 1.17% for Portugal to 60.18% for Germany. Moreover, most of the gains are due to Germany,
Belgium, and Denmark, whose competitiveness, as measured by ψls/(γsf ls), is among the highest
in the sample26. Overall the increase in productivity is large (19.80%). It corresponds to a 13.14%
reduction of average markups and prices and a decrease of 22.57% (12.96%) in average profits
(quantities). These numbers suggest that substantial gains can still be expected from further
behind-the-border integration in the EU.
Gains for France amount to 8.86%. Adding this figure to the 8.08% gain from not being under
autarky in 2000 yields an hypothetical 16.94% total productivity gain from international trade.
This number is much closer to the 24.88% productivity boost coming from intra-national trade
competition. This suggests that, even for a large and compact country like France, international
trade (especially as we neglect trade with other partners) is likely to become a major channel
25See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Chen (2004).
26In unreported simulations, we have also computed productivity levels in the absence of border and language
effects. For Belgium and Germany we find much reduced values (in the 30-35 % range). This is likely to come
from the fact that these two countries enjoy high productivity levels and share a common language. In our counter-
factual scenario, bilateral trade between these countries creates artificially high productivity gains, which decrease
substantially when language barriers to trade disappear in other countries.
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Table 14: Gains from removing border impediments to trade: OLS estimations, countries.
Country name Country initials Gains from removing the border effect (%)
Belgium BE 42.30
Germany DE 60.18
Denmark DK 35.98
Spain ES 18.37
Finland FI 15.01
France FR 8.86
Great Britain GB 3.61
Italy IT 6.37
Netherlands NL 9.66
Portugal PT 1.17
Sweden SE 16.28
Average 19.80
Note: the figure for France denotes an average taken over regions.
through which competition and selection stimulate productivity growth.
7 Robustness concerns
In this section we examine how robust our three counterfactual estimates are to changes in the
techniques used to estimate TFP and trade frictions. We start by presenting these alternative
techniques, then present the results.
7.1 Robustness checks
Levinsohn-Petrin estimation (LP) The OLS estimation of total factor productivity may suffer
from a simultaneity bias. Indeed, managers may hire factors after observing idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks unknown to the econometrician. A greater realization of the shock will lead to greater
factor demand. Then observed factor quantities will be correlated with the residual of the OLS
regression in (20).
The bias can be removed by identifying an observable proxy variable for these shocks and
introducing it as an additional regressor in (20). The proxy must be such that, according to
economic theory, it can be expected to respond to the TFP realization observed only by the firm.
Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as an additional regressor, while Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
- henceforth LP - use intermediate inputs. Due to data availability constraints on investments, we
can only use the latter technique. Furthermore, the Amadeus dataset does not include information
on the cost of materials for Denmark and the UK, forcing us to restrict ourselves to 8 national and
21 sub-national economies.27
Aggregate productivity (AP) As a second robustness check, we use data on value-added
per hour worked by sector-country pairs provided by the Groningen Growth and Development
27This is another reason why we chose to rely on OLS rather than LP estimates in the previous section. In addition,
returns to scale estimated with this technique are in some cases significantly smaller than one. This is likely to come
from heterogeneous definitions of input consumption across countries in the Amadeus dataset.
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Table 15: Gains from removing border impediments to trade: OLS estimations, French regions.
Region name NUTS 2 code Gains from removing the border effect (%)
Ile de France FR10 0.06
Champagne-Ardennes FR21 -7.18
Picardie FR22 3.52
Haute-Normandie FR23 13.91
Centre FR24 9.62
Basse-Normandie FR25 23.04
Bourgogne FR26 6.66
Nord-Pas de Calais FR31 -2.46
Lorraine FR41 -2.22
Alsace FR42 1.83
Franche-Comte´ FR43 5.37
Pays de la Loire FR51 8.57
Bretagne FR52 16.32
Poitou-Charentes FR53 5.12
Aquitaine FR61 38.23
Midi-Pyre´ne´es FR62 15.24
Limousin FR63 2.86
Rhoˆne-Alpes FR71 6.07
Auvergne FR72 4.32
Languedoc-Roussillon FR81 17.13
PACA FR82 19.98
Average 8.86
Centre (GGDC).28 This robustness check allows us to address concerns with country coverage and
sample representativeness in the Amadeus dataset. Country coverage concerns apply particularly
to Denmark, Germany and Portugal, even though in the German case we were able to complement
our data with the MIP dataset (provided by ZEW) to make this problem less severe. Sample
representativeness concerns apply to all countries as the Amadeus and, to a lesser extent, the EAE
dataset are biased towards large firms.
The GGDC data represent the most accurate and comparable measures of productivity at
the industry level. Moreover, these measures, contrary to ours, are deflated by industry-specific
producer price indices. However, the drawback of these data is that they do not take capital
intensity into account.
Single-region firms (SR) A third concern regards French firms that own plants in several French
regions. In this case, it is in fact not clear to which region we should attribute the productivity of the
firm. While the EAE survey does allow us to distinguish between productive and non-productive
establishments, it does not contain sufficient information to reconstruct the value added created by
each plant. To address this concern, we simply exclude from our sample firms that operate plants
in several regions. We are left with 19279 French firms (instead of 23203) to recover the distribution
of TFP.
28Data on productivities come from the ICOP Industrial Database (New Benchmarks), at the NACE rev. 1 sector
level. To convert these data to our 18-industry classification, we weight observations by total hours worked found in
the GGDC 60-Industry Database. These data are available at http : //www.ggdc.net
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Shape parameter (k) A fourth robustness check regards the estimation of the shape parameter
ks of the Pareto distribution of TFP. As argued by Bernard et al. (2003), TFP estimates are very
likely to be biased because of measurement errors. Even if we take the optimistic view that these
errors are uncorrelated with the ‘true’ unobservable productivity, this should deflate the estimate
parameter ks. This is because measurement errors add to the variability of TFP, whose standard
error is a decreasing function of ks under the Pareto assumption.29
Bernard et al. (2003) assume that the productivity of the most efficient producer of each good
follows a Fre´chet distribution. Their solution to the measurement error problem consists in inferring
the shape parameter of this distribution from aggregate data. They proceed by matching the
productivity and size advantage of exporters between simulation results and actual data. While this
indeed solves the measurement error problem, it comes at the cost of imposing more assumptions
on demand and market structure to recover the average productivity of exporters.
The absence of reliable data on exports in the Amadeus database prevents us from replicating
the Bernard et al. (2003) exercise on a comparable basis for all economies. However, as a simple
robustness check, we apply the figure found by these authors for the entire manufacturing in the
U.S. (namely ks = 3.6, for all sectors) to reconstruct our productivity counterfactuals.
Alternative border effects (ABE) A fifth robustness check regards the estimation of the coun-
try of destination-country-specific border effects. As is well-known in the literature, the magnitude
of border effects is highly sensitive to both the estimation and the distance measurement meth-
ods.30 Therefore our counterfactuals, and in particular the ‘United Europe’ experiment, might be
also sensitive to alternative borders’ estimations.
Starting from the very high value (-3.09) initially found for trade between Canadian provinces
and US states by McCallum (1995), the literature has subsequently shown that border effects are of
a much smaller magnitude with fixed effects for origin and destination countries being a useful tool
to get reliable estimates.31 Using this technique in our baseline estimation of gravity we find an
average border effect of −0.97, which belongs to the lower bound of recent studies and is comparable
to the estimate in Chen (2004) for Europe (-1.32). In this sense, our subsequent estimates of the
productivity gains from eliminating border effects should be considered as relatively ‘prudent’.
Nevertheless, as shown by Head and Mayer (2002), using the arithmetic mean in the computation
of distance based on sub-economy units - i.e setting θ = 1 in equation (18) - also inflates border
effects. To deal with this problem we perform an additional robustness check by adopting the
alternative distance measure (ditwces) obtained using the harmonic mean (θ = −1).
Internal distances (ID) The sixth robustness check applies to the measurement of internal
distances. In our baseline simulations we measure them by using the weighted distance across sub-
units or, when we deal with intra-NUTS3 distances, by means of the disk-shaped approximation.
These internal distances are important because they allow us to introduce border effects in the
gravity equations, i.e. to measure how disproportionately an economy trades with itself after
controlling for distance.
However, it has been argued that internal distances suffer from mis-measurement and some
researchers (like Bernard et al., 2003) prefer to use the (rather strong) assumption that intra-
29If X has a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, then the standard error of ln(X) is equal to 1k . Consider
then the standard error of ln( ˆProdi,OLS) = ˆconst+ ˆi. As long as there is an uncorrelated measurement error in the
estimates of const and i, the standard error of ˆconst+ ˆi should be greater than that of const+ i. Therefore the
parameter k should be underestimated.
30See Head and Mayer (2002) and Chen (2004).
31See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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economy trade comes at no distance cost (in our terminology, that ρll = 1,∀l). To a certain extent,
this just amounts to a choice of unit. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the cost of shipping goods
within a small country like Belgium is the same as the cost of shipping goods within Germany.
In order to neutralize the effect of internal distance mis-measurement, we first eliminate intra-
national trade observations from the estimation of the gravity equation, i.e. those data that require
internal distances. Note, however, that in this case border effects cannot be estimated anymore.
Second, we choose the distance measurement unit in such a way that the intra-economy freeness
of trade parameters in each sector (as hypothetically reconstructed from internal distances and the
estimated elasticity of trade with respect to distance) equals 1 on average and we then actually set
all ρll’s equal to one.
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation of gravity equations (PPML) An-
other potential concern is the bias in our distance elasticity estimates. As shown by Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006), interpreting the parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS (such
as standard gravity regressions) as elasticities can lead to a serious bias when the true model is
defined in levels and heteroscedasticity is at work. As a further robustness check, we thus apply
the PPML estimation technique developed by these authors to our gravity model.
Regional trade data (RT1 and RT2) Finally, we also consider French regional trade data in
order to get a more accurate measure of trade freeness between those regions and the 10 destination
countries. In one robustness check (RT1) we enrich the CEPII data with imports and exports
between French regions and our set of European countries when estimating the gravity equation
(19). This augmented dataset should in principle allow us to get a more detailed picture of trade
between our 31 economies. However, the match between the original NSTR (Nomenclature for
Transport Statistics) coding of the regional trade data (by product) and our sectoral classification
is sometimes problematic (especially for the Food industry). Furthermore, we do not have reliable
data on the value of local French production by sector that are needed in order to estimate apparent
regional consumption (EXP lls ). For both reasons we use CEPII international trade data as the
baseline estimation.
As an attempt to get a more precise measurement of intra-France trade costs, we also consider
alternative values of the elasticity of intra-national trade with respect to distance as provided by
Combes et al. (2005). Their gravity regressions are based on data on commodity flows between
French de´partements (NUTS3 regions) coming from the SITRAM database. The major drawback
of these data is that they do not necessarily correspond to ‘trade’ between two given locations but
simply shipments: goods arrived at the recorded destination may well be subsequently shipped to
another French de´partement or outside France for final consumption. Moreover, the commodity
flow data provide only information about the quantity in physical units (weight), and not about
their value. However, in the most comparable estimation of gravity, they find an average elasticity
δs across sectors of −1.76 which is just 5% higher than our −1.68.32 To check the sensitivity of
our results to a different intra-France trade cost structure, we perform a further robustness check
(RT2) in which we re-scale our δs (to match the average −1.76) in the computation of ρlhs whenever
l and h correspond to two French regions.
32The fact that the elasticity of trade with respect to distance is higher for intra-national compared to international
trade is likely to be related to different transportation modes. Intra-national trade uses mainly ground transportation,
which is shown by Disdier and Head (2004) to yield higher distance coefficients.
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7.2 Results
Costs of non-Europe Table 16 offers a range of estimates of the ‘costs of non-Europe’ obtained
through all our robustness checks. For the sake of comparison, we also report the OLS estimates
presented in the previous Section.
First, we can observe that our new estimates are roughly consistent with the OLS estimates in all
cases. Indeed, the European (including French) average cost of non-Europe amounts to a 11.58%
productivity loss with OLS estimations, while it ranges from 9.72 to 17.20 % under alternative
estimations. Note that the smallest figure is found under LP estimations, which involve a smaller
number of economies due to data availability. It should therefore come as no surprise that the gains
from EU trade are slightly underestimated with this technique.
Table 16: Costs of non-Europe: robustness checks.
Economy OLS LP AP SR k ID ABE PPML RT1 RT2
BE 18.78 13.65 28.53 18.78 16.99 25.71 19.32 26.06 19.98 18.80
DE 16.94 21.19 7.61 16.96 22.51 11.47 21.02 23.82 18.35 16.97
DK 22.04 n.a. 33.21 22.06 22.24 24.22 20.15 33.54 25.43 22.08
ES 10.40 9.66 10.62 10.41 10.97 3.73 3.39 12.14 9.79 10.40
FI 11.98 13.70 23.63 11.99 10.63 7.78 18.46 13.97 13.92 11.99
GB 3.22 n.a. 5.51 3.22 3.71 2.25 3.04 5.63 3.91 3.22
IT 6.58 5.29 12.81 6.59 5.57 2.56 7.55 9.86 7.34 6.59
NL 13.99 15.15 21.39 13.99 13.24 17.63 16.85 20.33 14.67 14.00
PT 3.27 -3.79 2.11 3.27 3.07 5.14 4.65 6.62 3.79 3.27
SE 12.06 6.54 25.43 12.06 8.92 6.03 14.08 18.07 13.25 12.06
FR10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 8.30 0.39 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05
FR21 13.35 19.37 29.63 12.89 14.79 21.17 20.87 14.17 16.00 19.67
FR22 12.42 8.16 21.83 12.87 9.16 -3.63 16.20 13.32 12.05 15.44
FR23 8.04 1.79 16.29 8.19 7.42 20.31 21.15 12.15 6.28 9.77
FR24 10.07 6.12 20.10 10.06 9.58 12.96 15.32 11.08 10.54 13.06
FR25 12.58 1.68 21.57 13.13 10.04 23.04 22.52 15.90 12.37 15.12
FR26 5.48 3.74 14.57 5.67 5.50 11.68 12.34 3.26 5.71 7.94
FR31 6.78 8.60 15.25 7.73 5.18 18.40 17.23 -2.38 10.26 10.33
FR41 11.87 11.26 24.97 11.61 8.15 16.82 18.13 13.44 12.49 14.32
FR42 8.84 8.38 25.28 8.77 8.03 25.37 17.54 15.65 9.73 10.78
FR43 8.90 7.75 20.72 10.54 8.90 19.52 16.40 11.80 9.49 10.93
FR51 5.61 4.12 12.93 5.90 4.87 13.26 12.26 3.65 6.47 7.75
FR52 8.15 6.18 31.30 9.67 16.76 21.85 22.86 20.57 10.97 14.48
FR53 5.32 3.63 12.80 5.20 6.56 15.53 13.10 1.00 6.35 7.18
FR61 13.09 11.63 24.90 13.39 13.68 21.68 23.28 17.28 12.53 15.78
FR62 9.31 8.25 20.30 8.77 9.32 20.43 19.55 14.41 11.27 11.55
FR63 2.63 1.87 9.72 2.52 1.42 12.01 11.23 1.33 3.18 4.06
FR71 4.52 3.92 13.00 4.55 3.63 8.91 8.66 5.95 5.13 6.08
FR72 4.34 3.19 11.10 4.41 -2.21 14.58 12.13 3.62 4.98 5.98
FR81 9.01 7.31 18.33 6.43 9.74 18.42 18.23 13.02 10.50 11.16
FR82 9.45 8.21 19.90 9.55 10.66 18.61 15.92 12.83 4.04 11.59
France 8.08 6.09 18.31 8.18 7.67 16.15 15.97 9.62 8.58 10.62
Europe 11.58 9.72 17.20 11.59 11.41 11.15 13.13 16.33 12.64 11.82
Second, it appears that the OLS estimates slightly understate the extent of the ’costs of non-
Europe’. However, we take comfort in the fact that the alternative estimates are extremely cor-
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related with the OLS ones, suggesting a simple difference in scale. For instance the correlation
between AP and OLS estimates is equal to 0.72 (and 0.84 if we exclude Germany).33 Under the
AP simulation, one may further note that the French cost of non-Europe is actually pretty high.
This happens because labor productivity in France is the second highest in our sample. Therefore
France is now predicted to have a better underlying technology and greater gains from trade with
other partner countries.
The SR and k estimates are virtually identical to the OLS, while ABE ones suggest a higher
cost of non-Europe for France. This latter result is due to the smaller estimates of border effects
(the average is now −0.25) obtained with distwces that make observed international trade freer
and so more costly to abandon. PPML results are also highly correlated (0.90) with our baseline.
A greater magnitude was also to be expected under PPML as the literature finds smaller estimates
of distance elasticities with this technique: for instance, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) report
coefficients that can be twice as small as in OLS estimations. With less severe trade frictions, rivals
at a given distance will impose more competitive pressure on home firms. It follows logically that
the cost of inhibiting international trade should be greater.
Some differences arise with ID estimates. The correlation with OLS estimates is still high
(0.43), but with no internal trade frictions smaller economies (like Belgium or French regions)
systematically lose more from the elimination of international trade. This comes as no surprise
because by setting the internal freeness of both large and small countries to the same value we are
systematically over(under)estimating the contribution of the internal competition of large (small)
countries on their productivity. As a result a large (small) country appears to have an inferior
(superior) technology. Finally, as for RT1, there is basically no major difference with respect to
OLS and for RT2, unsurprisingly, constraining intra-national trade to have a higher elasticity with
respect to distance increases the impact of international trade on selection and productivity for
France.
Costs of non-France The results of the same robustness checks on the estimation of the ‘costs
of non-France’ are displayed in Table 17. The correlation between the baseline OLS and other
specifications is even stronger here, with only SR and ID results being slightly different for Paris
(FR10). As for SR, some very productive Parisian firms have plants located in many regions. Ne-
glecting these firms results in underestimating that region’s underlying competitiveness parameter
ψls/(γsf ls), and therefore the gains from trade. Concerning the ID case, since the Paris region is the
smallest in France, its underlying productivity (and thus how much it would lose) is also overesti-
mated, for reasons stated above. Finally PPML results, although suggesting higher costs for the
reasons already discussed, are extremely correlated (0.98) with our baseline. Crucially, comparing
the two Tables, the core result on the relative magnitude of the costs of non-Europe and non-France
holds across all alternative specifications: for an average French region it is always true that the
costs of non-Europe are smaller than the costs of non-France.
United Europe Table 18 displays the gains from the ‘United Europe’ experiment. As with the
costs of non-Europe, we still find that our OLS estimates are broadly consistent with alternative
estimates. Correlations range from 0.73 to 0.90, with the only exception of the AP case (0.16).
The discrepancies essentially come from Germany and French regions. As stated above, France
performs much better than Germany in labor productivity rankings, while the converse is true in
TFP rankings. In the ABE case, as expected, the costs of non-Europe are lower, because average
33As mentioned earlier, there is a potential bias towards firms coming from former West Germany in the Amadeus
dataset. We can only partly correct this bias by using the MIP dataset.
30
Table 17: Costs of non-France: robustness checks.
Economy OLS LP AP SR k ID ABE PPML RT1 RT2
FR10 5.31 4.69 6.89 1.69 6.35 22.56 6.38 18.46 5.61 4.33
FR21 32.99 36.40 34.73 33.05 24.06 38.80 35.76 44.04 34.91 32.38
FR22 31.76 35.18 32.32 32.56 18.69 36.72 33.86 40.28 33.00 31.74
FR23 21.10 22.27 20.47 21.05 15.58 32.19 27.33 32.71 21.21 20.23
FR24 31.80 34.11 32.48 31.45 23.77 24.74 33.31 38.87 31.96 31.27
FR25 23.77 25.36 23.43 24.51 16.01 26.61 26.27 33.62 24.70 22.99
FR26 33.12 35.16 33.28 33.97 25.30 33.17 35.75 42.58 34.00 32.48
FR31 11.67 15.42 12.04 12.77 7.10 26.28 18.47 24.36 14.81 12.43
FR41 22.50 24.39 23.63 22.10 16.95 28.36 26.30 33.88 24.10 21.89
FR42 21.95 23.95 23.35 21.99 13.99 32.48 26.29 34.96 23.82 21.09
FR43 29.87 32.68 31.85 32.56 21.85 36.05 33.02 40.88 31.52 29.02
FR51 25.50 26.84 25.35 26.36 18.97 22.22 26.23 34.60 25.84 24.93
FR52 22.39 23.34 24.83 22.46 16.90 18.19 23.41 33.47 21.20 21.77
FR53 30.06 31.86 31.30 29.17 21.98 28.25 32.17 39.24 30.65 29.29
FR61 25.63 26.06 26.43 26.64 18.53 21.88 26.73 35.13 25.02 24.96
FR62 24.75 25.39 26.12 24.23 13.55 23.11 25.36 34.32 25.68 24.08
FR63 32.34 33.46 32.49 32.42 23.32 39.69 36.19 42.43 33.75 31.19
FR71 20.17 21.68 21.54 20.30 15.90 18.07 20.03 30.05 21.14 19.69
FR72 30.22 31.47 31.76 30.80 20.32 34.64 33.57 40.20 31.62 29.33
FR81 25.48 26.13 26.43 22.36 17.78 23.81 26.35 35.53 27.13 25.21
FR82 20.02 20.80 21.54 21.65 16.80 19.20 20.59 32.07 21.96 20.42
France 24.88 26.51 25.82 24.96 17.80 27.95 27.30 35.32 25.89 24.32
estimated border effects are much smaller (and so there is less to gain from their removal), while
imposing a higher elasticity of internal trade with respect to distance (RT2) increases the potential
benefits for France stemming from more international integration. Finally notice that in the ID
experiment border effects cannot be identified, which is the reason why we do not perform this
robustness check here.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a multi-economy multi-sector model of inter- and intra-national trade with
heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition and variable markups. We then calibrate this model
using country-level trade figures and firm-level data for 10 EU countries and 21 French regions.
Simulating counterfactual trade integration scenarios, we find that, in the French case, the
selection effect due to intra-national trade is stronger than that of international trade. For an
average French region, the disruption of international trade is found to decrease productivity by
8.08%, while the productivity loss due to no intra-national trade amounts to 24.88%. In these
two experiments, prices and markups are also found to increase substantially (10.31% without
international trade, 36.03% without intra-national trade), while profits will increase considerably
(19.61% without international trade, 69.28% without intra-national trade) together with quantities
(7.12% without international trade and 23.03% without intra-national trade). These results suggest
that while the selection effect of international trade can be substantial, national markets still play
an important role in shaping competition.
Furthermore, we find that border impediments to trade (defined in an empirical way) also have
significant effects on firm productivity. Simulating the complete removal of ‘border effects’, we
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Table 18: Gains from United Europe: robustness checks.
Economy OLS LP AP SR k ABE PPML RT1 RT2
BE 42.30 28.00 17.21 42.48 12.89 12.38 16.35 47.64 30.12
DE 60.18 39.33 6.87 47.08 42.32 21.51 20.66 40.76 49.17
DK 35.98 n.a. 88.54 36.48 17.08 14.74 37.78 37.34 35.10
ES 18.37 30.43 35.43 18.52 9.18 1.76 14.64 18.23 16.57
FI 15.01 36.76 37.27 15.03 12.44 5.65 26.05 24.15 14.80
GB 3.61 n.a. 10.12 3.63 3.64 0.93 3.34 2.75 3.14
IT 6.37 5.47 18.56 6.50 4.59 0.98 6.51 5.42 5.81
NL 9.66 4.49 16.93 9.61 19.99 3.40 23.33 8.17 10.21
PT 1.17 8.96 0.86 1.17 0.49 1.40 1.47 1.60 1.16
SE 16.28 5.36 10.59 16.30 7.69 5.22 12.14 18.20 15.81
FR10 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.08
FR21 -7.18 -10.12 19.06 -7.61 -1.68 -2.92 -8.51 -8.71 -5.56
FR22 3.52 -4.27 18.11 10.34 3.53 0.34 8.44 7.63 6.29
FR23 13.91 -3.14 13.89 7.00 6.22 -0.55 16.75 9.29 10.78
FR24 9.62 2.77 18.14 10.17 10.10 1.62 11.85 28.22 18.70
FR25 23.04 -6.33 19.67 26.47 13.05 -0.40 27.02 29.22 35.83
FR26 6.66 4.09 19.18 6.92 6.14 3.17 5.44 5.81 11.65
FR31 -2.46 -5.97 1.49 -2.39 -1.50 -3.23 -3.19 -2.35 0.78
FR41 -2.22 -4.07 29.09 -2.57 -2.67 -0.78 -4.41 -3.47 2.69
FR42 1.83 6.77 54.55 1.64 -1.05 5.97 1.17 4.19 7.55
FR43 5.37 7.89 54.58 7.08 0.24 10.37 14.97 6.86 8.70
FR51 8.57 5.38 16.15 9.58 7.27 1.61 4.83 6.74 12.52
FR52 16.32 13.08 3.28 46.75 27.89 2.55 15.49 16.41 48.30
FR53 5.12 5.80 34.39 4.53 11.01 1.11 6.85 5.63 9.34
FR61 38.23 23.05 31.39 31.99 24.28 11.53 27.26 34.05 58.04
FR62 15.24 8.46 19.37 11.63 3.23 15.82 17.95 29.69 24.56
FR63 2.86 2.03 12.04 2.63 3.34 2.12 -1.47 2.42 5.17
FR71 6.07 5.34 43.26 6.07 3.24 5.10 6.51 4.92 11.86
FR72 4.32 2.38 30.65 4.46 8.27 1.85 2.81 3.50 7.50
FR81 17.13 12.69 39.86 15.29 14.32 11.50 21.66 18.02 26.43
FR82 19.98 22.16 46.74 25.35 10.87 19.17 30.72 30.43 33.46
France 8.86 4.19 25.00 10.26 6.96 4.09 9.63 10.88 15.94
Europe 19.80 18.11 24.31 18.82 12.48 6.55 15.63 19.56 17.98
find that productivity would increase by 8.86% for an average French region, with a corresponding
decrease in prices and markups by 6.63% and a drop of average profits (quantities) of 11.77%
(6.63%). The magnitude is larger for the 11 EU countries as a whole with a productivity gain
of 19.80%, a decrease in prices and markups of 13.14% and a drop of 22.57% (12.96%)in average
profits (quantities). Even 8 years after the completion of the European Single Market, substantial
gains from international trade were still to be expected from further behind-the-border integration
in the EU.
Our results withstand a battery of robustness checks related to the measurement of productivity
and trade openness, with estimates of productivity gains and losses remaining substantial and close
to the benchmark results. While the 1988 Cecchini Report offered some predictions of the benefits
from the Single Market Programme (in the range of 4 to 6,5% of GDP), relatively little research
has been devoted to its ex post evaluation. Our results can, thus, be seen as a contribution in that
direction that focuses on the effects of non-tariff barriers on productivity and markups.
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There are, nonetheless, several issues that call for further research. Starting with the comparison
between the costs of non-Europe and those of non-France, at first glance intra-national trade does
not seem to be substantially more important than international trade. The export share of output
in a typical French region is equal to 22%, while the intra-national trade share is 22.5%. However,
given the trade costs frictions in 2000, intra-national competition still dominates in all specifications.
The estimation of the relative degree of inter- vs intra-national openness is crucial for this result and
we address this issue in a variety of ways using the best available data and estimation techniques.
However, the lack of truly comparable intra-national and international trade data in the present
study calls for additional investigation.
Second, we are probably underestimating the total effect of international trade because, even
though the 10 countries in our sample represent 61% of French exports, we are not considering
trade with other important developed countries (like the US and Japan) and developing ones (like
India and China). This is due to the lack of comparable firm-level data. Third, intra-national
results are likely to be very different for smaller countries than France (such as Belgium and the
Netherlands) that heavily rely on international trade. It would also be interesting to perform a
comparable exercise on similarly large European economies (such as the UK, Germany or Italy) that
have a less compact geography than France and display starker inter-regional disparities. Fourth,
the substantial productivity gains from further behind-the-border integration rest on the correct
estimation of border effects. In particular, we have shown that the gains from ‘United Europe’
might be larger or smaller depending on the estimation technique and the distance measure but
still remain substantial. Furthermore, the magnitude of our border effects belongs to the lower
bound of recent studies, thus providing rather conservative predictions.
Finally, the interpretation of border effects is itself still debated. If we take the strong view
that border effects entirely reflect some trade frictions, the available evidence on the sources of such
frictions is rather mixed. On the one side, Head and Mayer (2000) show that non-tariff barriers
to trade do not explain border effects in Europe while Hillberry (1999) finds little evidence that
tariffs, regulations, information and communication costs explain border effects. On the other hand,
Chen (2004) shows that technical barriers to trade and product-specific information costs do play
a significant role in generating border effects while Turrini and van Ypersele (2006) highlight the
empirical relevance of legal asymmetries. Wolf (2000) and Combes et al (2005) provide evidence that
border effects exist also within a country making it questionable whether the ‘complete’ removal of
‘borders’ is really feasible. One possible explanation of such ‘persistent’ border effects is put forth by
Chen (2004) who shows that, to some extent, those effects do not reflect any trade impediment but
instead emerge as an econometric artifact from the co-location of industries related by input-output
relationships.
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Figure 1: The costs of Non-Europe for French regions
Figure 2: Accessibility to international trade for French regions
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Figure 3: The costs of Non-France for French regions
Figure 4: Accessibility to intra-national trade for French regions
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